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The Assistance of Counsel a Defendant’s Right 
The United States Constitution is the basis for all law in United States and the Bill of 
Rights provides protection for the fundamental freedoms of American citizens.  The Sixth 
Amendment’s Assistance of Counsel Clause mandates access to an attorney for all United States 
citizens.  The case of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) ruled that it is mandatory to provide an attor-
ney for any person facing a felony charge who cannot afford one.  In Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 
the Court ruled that a person has a right to an attorney before their trial while in police custody.  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) replaced Escobedo by requiring police to enumerate a defendant’s 
rights before interrogation, which included remaining silent and the ability to request an attorney.  
Dickerson v United States (2000) preserved the protections put forth in Miranda.  Given the 
complexities of the law and obstacles in the trial process, the Supreme Court correctly upheld the 
right for United States citizens to have an attorney for their defense or to be provided one if they 
cannot afford one. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides many legal protections 
for the American people, the most critical of which is the right to an attorney.  As a part of the 
Bill of Rights the Sixth Amendment was developed by the Founders to help assuage fears that 
the central federal government might abuse the rights of its citizens.  The Sixth Amendment 
states “In all criminal prosecution the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the Assistance of 
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Counsel in his defense.”   The Founders believed that any citizen has the right to an attorney.  i
The Sixth Amendment is brief but the promise is clear that any citizen facing a serious criminal 
charge irregardless of circumstances has a right to counsel provided by an attorney. 
The decision of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) changed the United States’ legal system by 
mandating that even if a defendant could not afford a lawyer one must be provided for them at 
the state and federal level for all felony cases.  Prior to 1963 the Court did not believe that the 
Bill of Rights applied to the states.  It was not until the twentieth century with a more powerful 
central government and a change in the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that the 
Court shifted its stance in the opposite direction.   In 1961 Clarence Earl Gideon was arrested for ii
burglarizing a pool hall.  Gideon was fifty-one and had a long list of prior convictions.  He had 
spent his time in jail trying to teach himself the law.   Gideon was brought to court where he iii
asked for, but was denied, an attorney for his defense.  Gideon was denied counsel because of the 
Supreme Court case Betts v. Brady (1942) which had similar circumstances to Gideon.   The iv
Court ruled that in non-capital cases counsel could only be appointed if the defendant was very 
young, illiterate, mentally unsound, or if the case was very technical and the absence of counsel 
would make receiving a fair trial impossible.  In addition the Court mandated that if the trial was 
unfair, because the defendants’ interests were not protected, the case could be overturned.   When v
Gideon lost his case and was sentenced to five years in prison he appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court.  vi
The United States Supreme Court received Clarence Gideon’s writ of certiorari April 21, 
1962 on prison stationary.   Gideon was not a well-educated man but in his appeal he made a vii
compelling statement “It makes no difference how old I am or what color I am or what church I 
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belong too if any.  The question is I did not get a fair trial.  The question is very simple.  I re-
quested the court to appoint me a attorney and the court refused.  All countrys try to give there 
citizens a fair trial and see to it that they have counsel.”   The court agreed and ruled in viii
Gideon’s favor unanimously signaling its overwhelming support for the Constitution’s protection 
of the right to an attorney.  Justice Hugo Black wrote the decision and properly laid out the the 
intention of the Sixth Amendment’s Assistance of Counsel clause to protect defendants.  Black 
acknowledged how difficult it is for the poor and needy to be able to afford the services of an 
attorney.  Additionally he raised the point that state governments spend large sums of money to 
pay for prosecuting attornies to protect the public’s interests in court.   Black stated “that the ix
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to de-
fend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are ne-
cessities, not luxuries.”   The Court believed that because people who can do hire attorneys, peox -
ple who cannot afford to hire a lawyer have the right to be provided counsel under the protection 
of the Assistance of Counsel clause.   
The Gideon decision was a long time coming; when Gideon wrote his petition to the 
Supreme Court only two states wrote amicus curia briefs in support of the state of Florida.  Addi-
tionally in only five states were there laws that explicitly prevented assignment of counsel.   xi
Twenty-two states wrote briefs supporting Gideon and affirming the need to repeal Betts v. Brady 
(1942).   Certainly a determining factor in the repeal of Betts was the the number of lawyers xii
coming into state cases on appeal and finding serious problems in the trials of defendants without 
a lawyer.   Some states were reluctant to comply with the ruling of Gideon but the decision set xiii
minimum standards.  This meant that in order to ignore the Gideon ruling the states would have 
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to show a substantial interest in not complying.   However, the overwhelming mood, supported xiv
by amicus curia briefs, was that Betts was not the correct way of doing things.  Indigent defen-
dants or anyone else for that matter could not stand on their own in the United States legal sys-
tem without being outmatched by the prosecution.   
The Court knew the majority of the States wanted to do away with Betts and was ready to 
join them.  The feelings of the Justices at the time can be attested to by attorney Bruce Jacob who 
represented Florida in the case, “Never…had I encountered anything like the zeal and emotion 
that emerged in the questioning.  Anger seemed to characterize my most relentless questioner.  A 
constant rain of hostile questions came from most of the justices.”   The Court had shifted realxv -
izing the error it had made in Betts and determined to fix the mistake by supporting Gideon.  Jus-
tice Black, joined by Murphy and Douglas, had written a dissenting opinion in Betts that argued 
that the right to counsel was a part of the Due Process Clause.  When Black read the details of 
Gideon’s case he believed that Betts and Gideon were almost indistinguishable.  Black was con-
vinced by pre-Betts precedents as well as “reason and reflection" that Betts had been denied in-
correctly.  The Court correctly sided with the Constitutional rights of citizens to have an attorxvi -
ney for counsel and protection.  The United States legal system is far to complicated for the 
uninitiated to plan his or her own defense.  
The Gideon decision changed the nature of the United States legal process.  The Court 
ruled that through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Gideon applied to the 
states as well.  This meant that all state governments had to accommodate any person who re-
quested an attorney.  This opened the flood gates compelling states to establish a public defend-
ers office.  The concern of how to accomplish the difficulties of assigning lawyers upon request 
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came up during the oral arguments for Gideon.  However, Abe Fortas representing Gideon coun-
tered that it would be simple for anyone seeking an attorney at the court house to be directed to 
the proper room.   Gideon v. Wainwright began the argument over Sixth Amendment protection xvii
of counsel but other cases helped expand the safeguards.   
Escobedo v Illinois (1964) extended the right of counsel to all United States citizens dur-
ing the interrogation process, forcing police to change their tactics.  Danny Escobedo was a 
twenty-two year old immigrant from Mexico with no prior record with the police.  In January of 
1960 he was arrested in connection with the murder of his brother-in-law and interrogated by the 
police.   Escobedo was released later that day by his attorney on a writ of habeas corpus.  Ten xviii
days later Escobedo was again arrested after being implicated in the murder by another defen-
dant.  Escobedo was brought to the police station and interrogated.  xix
Not long after he was arrested Escobedo’s lawyer arrived at the police station and asked 
to see his client but was repeatedly denied because the police were still interrogating Escobedo.  
Escobedo was interrogated for three hours and asked to see his lawyer multiple times but was 
continuously denied.   At one point after his attorney had arrived, Escobedo could see his xx
lawyer through an open door across a room.  Escobedo’s attorney tried to yell to his client but he 
could not be understood.  Instead, he motioned that Escobedo should remain silent.   After an xxi
extended period of questioning Escobedo admitted to having some knowledge of the murder 
then, after continued questioning, further implicated himself in the crime.  An Assistant State At-
torney was brought in to record Escobedo’s statement; at no time did the State Attorney or any-
one else inform Escobedo of his rights.   The trial court accepted the confession despite Esxxii -
cobedo’s lawyer’s objections and convicted Escobedo of murder.  xxiii
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The United States Supreme Court voted five to four in favor of Escobedo’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  The court’s focus was on whether or not denying Escobedo’s request to see 
his lawyer while the police were conducting their interrogation violated the Assistance of Coun-
sel as extended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Justice Goldberg wrote the xxiv
decision and answered the charge with clear language:     
Where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime 
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police cus-
tody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incrimi-
nating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult 
with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitu-
tional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied ‘the Assistance of Counsel’ in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, as made obligatory upon the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  xxv
The Court had ruled that the actions taken by the officers was constitutionally unsound.  
Escobedo was being detained, both Escobedo and his lawyer had requested to see each other, and 
Escobedo was being interrogated for a charge of murder.  Under these circumstances denying 
Escobedo's request was wrong and should result in the negation of any confession extracted dur-
ing the interview. 
The outcome of Escobedo had far reaching implications that were not immediately clear 
but would help to pave the way for Miranda v. Arizona (1966).  The ruling from Escobedo creat-
ed controversy over exactly how it would be implemented and the affects it would have on police 
work.  The initial thought was that the Court had modified the voluntariness test by putting em-
phasis on the availability of counsel.   This potentially meant that a presiding judge in a case xxvi
would have to put more consideration into whether or not a defendant had legal representation 
during interrogation to prevent coerced confessions.  However, because the Court did not address 
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the voluntariness doctrine in Escobedo the proper interpretation was that the Court was setting a 
new constitutional doctrine.   Constitutional doctrines are rules of constitutional law that help xxvii
guide courts to make rulings, inform the actions of government workers, and shape the advice 
and arguments of lawyers.   This started the debate over exactly what this new doctrine conxxviii -
sisted of.  Did the decision mean a person needed to explicitly ask for an attorney, what was the 
proper application of counsel, what role should counsel play during interrogation, and more.  
Most importantly Escobedo raised the point of a defendant’s “absolute constitutional right to re-
main silent.”   The right to remain silent would be the corner stone for the coming Miranda xxix
decision but for now was left enigmatic.  
The Court defended the expanding Constitutional right to have access to an attorney with 
its ruling on Escobedo v. Illinois.  It believed it was strengthening the American system of justice 
by affording all citizens their rights.  The Court tried to protect the public as well as the integrity 
of the police and their work stating “We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, 
that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the 
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic 
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.”   The threat of forced confesxxx -
sions is dangerous to a legal system, such as that of the United States, which is based on civil 
rights.  Therefore abuses must be actively prevented with vigor and punished when carried out.  
The Justices in the Escobedo majority eloquently stated “No system worth preserving should 
have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, 
and exercise, these rights.”   The Court, continuing its confirmation of citizens’ rights, planted xxxi
an important seed with Escobedo that would reach maturity under Miranda.  
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Miranda v. Arizona (1966) was an important step forward in the protection of civl rights, 
making it necessary for police to inform a suspect of his or her right to remain silent while being 
interrogated and to be able to request representation by an attorney.  In March of 1963 a young 
women was abducted at knife point, driven out to the Arizona desert, raped, and then robbed.   xxxii
The police were able to find Miranda when the victims brother saw a car matching the descrip-
tion in the area where his sister had been attacked.  The brother took the the plate number and 
gave it to the authorities who traced it to Miranda through his girlfriend.   The police set up a xxxiii
line up with Miranda and three other men but the victim was unable to identify the man who had 
attacked her.  Undeterred by outcome of the line up the police went into the interrogation room 
where Miranda was waiting and lied to him, telling him that the woman had positively identified 
him.    xxxiv
Believing that he was going to prison Miranda willingly confessed to the rape, robing a 
different woman, and attempted robbery of another.   Miranda was given a standard form to xxxv
record his name, age, etc and then below write out his confession and sign with the detectives as 
witnesses.  At the bottom of the document it stated “I have read and understand the foregoing 
statement and herby swear to its truthfulness.”   After this the police brought the victim into xxxvi
see Miranda who positively identified her as the woman he had assaulted.  From there Miranda 
was finally placed under arrest and booked into the jail.  This is very significant because before 
this Miranda could have ended the interrogation and left the police station but because he did not 
know his rights he stayed.   Miranda was tried in two different cases one for the robbery and xxxvii
the other for kidnapping and rape.  In the rape case the compelling evidence against Miranda was 
his confession and the testimony of the victim and the detectives.  Miranda’s lawyer tried to ar-
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gue that the detectives violated Miranda’s constitutional rights when they obtained his confession 
but to no avail, Miranda was found guilty.    xxxviii
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for Miranda v Arizona and ruled in 
favor of Miranda by changing the way that police must behave when interrogating witnesses.  
Fourteen briefs were filed for Miranda with over seven hundred pages of argument on the consti-
tutional merits of the Miranda case.   John J. Flynn made the oral arguments for Miranda bexxxix -
fore the court in February of 1966.   Flynn was able to get through the opening of his argument xl
uninterrupted by the court which was unusual.  In some instances the Justices immediately begin 
questioning the attornies in order to explore the issue being argued.  It was not until Flynn raised 
the point that the police were focusing specifically on Miranda and that this created an adversari-
al situation that the justices began to interrupt.  The justices wanted to know if at the point when 
the investigation by the police began to focus on one subject in particular does this generate an 
adversarial situation?  Is it then at this the point where a person has a right to be guided by coun-
sel of an attorney?   Flynn agreed with the Justices that the adversarial nature of police interroxli -
gation was when the Assistance of Counsel clause triggered.  It was also at this point that Flynn 
began to weave the Fifth Amendment protections into his argument.  The briefs filed by the peti-
tioners for Miranda claimed Sixth Amendment not Fifth but, Flynn argued that it was the Fifth 
Amendment that set Miranda apart from previous cases like Gideon and Escobedo.   Flynn asxlii -
serted “Under the facts and circumstances of Miranda…that when the adversary process comes 
into being that the police, at the very least, had an obligation to extend to this man…his clear 
Fifth Amendment right, to afford to him his right of counsel”.   Justice Stewart in response to xliii
Flynn's assertion stated that a person being interviewed “can’t be advised of his rights unless 
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somebody knows what the rights are”.  To which Flynn responded succinctly “And the only per-
son that can adequately advise Ernesto Miranda is a lawyer.”   From here Flynn and the justices xliv
examined whether or not Miranda had been coerced into confessing what he had done.  With 
Flynn leading the discussion, the Court came to the conclusion that there was no coercion in the 
Miranda case.  Instead, critically Miranda had been induced or lead into incriminating himself 
with promises of freedom from the police.  xlv
The Miranda decision was another victory for defendants’ rights, providing greater pro-
tection through an extension of the Fifth Amendment.  The Justices who voted in favor of Mi-
randa chose to look to the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in addition to 
the Sixth Amendment protections.  Chief Justice Warren argued that the current system that po-
lice used to interrogate suspects wrongly motivated people to violate their right not to speak un-
less they were willing to.  It was well known that the police used threats of violence and promis-
es of leniency to get what they wanted from suspects.   In the decision the Court argued that xlvi
intense interrogation inside a police station “carries its own badge of intimidation.  To be sure, 
this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive to human dignity”.   The Court xlvii
believed that police questioning applied great pressure on suspects to confess whether they were 
guilty or innocent.  This push to confess by police irregardless of innocence, was dangerous and 
the court ruled in favor of Miranda, enumerating specific protections for suspects which became 
the Miranda rights.  The court believed that the new rights granted by Miranda gave defendants 
the “right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free 
will.”   The Court then warned that any interrogation that did not include a lawyer for the dexlviii -
fendant and the suspect does confess then the government is obligated to prove that “the defen-
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dant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel”.   After Miranda every person xlix
upon being arrested and interrogated had to be read their rights in order to ensure that they were 
not taken advantage of.  Miranda is a special decision because it is so widely known for its popu-
lar use in media.  But, much more importantly Miranda was constructed by the Justices incorpo-
rating the Sixth and Fifth Amendments.  Defendants had to be informed by their interrogators 
that they had the right to say nothing and to request an attorney to speak on their behalf for their 
own protection.  The Miranda decision strengthened the rights of United States citizens ensuring 
them the knowledge of their rights and access to counsel. 
The case of Dickerson v. United States (2000) sustained the ruling of Miranda v. Arizona 
and the protections provided by the decision against self-incrimination and the right of As-
sistance of Counsel for defendants.  Charles T. Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery and 
firearm charges.  While Dickerson was being questioned he made incriminating statements 
against himself.  Dickerson’s attorneys successfully argued that the statements Dickerson had 
made were inadmissible because he had not been properly “Mirandized”.   The government apl -
pealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which ruled Dickerson’s confession 
admissible based on Congressional law 18 U.S.C. 3501.   The statute was designed by Congress, li
after Miranda, and mandated that any confession given voluntarily will be admissible in federal 
court.   This was the first time the Department of Justice and Attorney Generals office had tried lii
to use 3501 because they wanted to test the statute and determine if the Supreme Court would 
allow the law to stand.  liii
The United States Supreme Court ruled against 18 U.S.C. 3501 and upheld Miranda as 
Constitutionally protected.  The decision of the Court was that the Miranda ruling properly laid 
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out the Constitutional protections that are provided by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.  The Court stated that Congress could not override Miranda saying  “We conclude that 
Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.  Follow-
ing the rule of stare decisis we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.”   The Court believed in liv
Miranda it had established a Constitutionally protected measure that it held Congress did not 
have the legislative right to interfere with.  
The Dickerson decision defended and upheld the core protections of Miranda v. Arizona.  
The rulings of Gideon and Escobedo decreed that Assistance of Counsel clause meant that every 
United States citizen had the right to an attorney during interrogation and the trial process.  Mi-
randa followed suit but added the additional Fifth Amendment protections allowing a person to 
remain silent during interrogation; as well as the requirement that police inform the individual of 
their Constitutional rights.  There are cases that followed Miranda which limited the ruling’s pro-
tections, such as United States v. Calandra (1974) in which statements that violate Miranda can 
be presented to a grand jury; New York v. Quarles (1984), which ruled that statements in viola-
tion of Miranda are permissible if they were used for public safety reasons; and United States v. 
Patane (2004) which ruled that derivative evidence obtained in violation of Miranda are admis-
sible.   The significance of Dickerson is that the Court did not, when it had the chance, set a new lv
precedent and totally overrule Miranda.  Miranda and Dickerson can be thought of as one con-
tinuous river and cases like Calandra or Quarles are dams and levees to control the flow of the 
river and make sure it does not over run its banks and cause disasters.  Miranda has been re-
strained with some decisions but the Justices viewed it as the best way to provide minimum pro-
tection for citizens.  However, the debate still continues with ongoing arguments about the best 
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way to handle Miranda and the cases related to it.  Some scholars have suggested using technol-
ogy to aid police in addition to Miranda warnings.  This could mean recording entire interroga-
tions not just the confessions or having recordings play the Miranda warning once a person has 
been placed into the police car.   These measures could be helpful because it would serve as furlvi -
ther protection to ensure that police are following the law and defendants do not have their rights 
violated.  The Supreme Court upheld the Miranda decisions Fifth and Sixth Amendment protec-
tions with Dickerson. 
   The United States Constitution “ordained and established" the minimum legal protec-
tions of every American in order to ensure their liberty and happiness.   The United States lvii
Supreme Court interpreted the Sixth Amendment Assistance of Counsel clause correctly, given 
the potential detrimental nature of the legal system, to provide people with the opportunity to re-
tain counsel for their protection.  The Court began with the case Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 
making it mandatory for state and federal courts in felony cases to provide a lawyer to anyone 
who asked.  Escobedo v Illinois (1964) required that anyone being interrogated who asked for an 
attorney be provided one.  The following case Miranda v Arizona (1966) maintained the right to 
counsel and ordered police to inform suspects of their Constitutional rights.  The Court upheld its 
ruling from Miranda in Dickerson v United States (2000) instead of setting a new precedent.  
The need for intelligent, experienced, and efficacious legal guidance cannot be disputed.  Attor-
neys are carefully trained and learn through experience in order to best protect their clients and 
give counsel.  Imagine a world without Gideon, Escobedo, and Miranda where people would be 
on their own in a court who's rules they did not know but had tremendous consequences.  Ask 
yourself if you would feel safe living in that world?    
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